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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct ("Rules")
became effective January 1, 1990.1 As a result, Texas lawyers no
longer practice under guidelines which include both aspirational
* B.B.A. University of Texas - El Paso; J.D., University of Texas. Member: Model
Rules of Professional Conduct Committee; District 9 Grievance Committee; College of the
State Bar of Texas; Texas Bar Foundation. Partner: Dear, Medina & Coyle; Austin, Texas.
** B.A., University of Minnesota - Duluth; Candidate for J.D. May 1990, St. Mary's
University School of Law. Student Representative: State Bar Committee on Lawyer Advertising, 1989-90.
1. See generally SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS, RULES GOVERNING THE STATE BAR OF
TEXAS art. X, § 9 (Rules of Professional Conduct) (1989) [hereinafter TEXAS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT]. The Texas Rules became effective January 1, 1990. Id.
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goals 2 and discretionary moral choices. 3 Instead, the newly adopted
Rules are mandatory in nature and depict a minimum standard of
professional conduct which, if violated, may subject the offending
lawyer to disciplinary action.4
The scope of the Rules is narrowly limited in the preamble to be
"proper conduct for purposes of professional discipline."5 More specifically, the preamble states the Rules "do not undertake to define
standards of civil liability of lawyers for professional conduct." 6 The
disclaimer was not included in the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility (the basis for the Texas Rules) inadvertently. The drafters of the Model Rules in fact strengthened the disclaimer after
concerns were raised that the statement regarding the intent of the
2. See Sales, The Texas DisciplinaryRules of ProfessionalConduct: A Model to Replace
the Outdated Texas Code of Professional Responsibility, 52 TEX. B.J. 388, 388 (1989)(ethical
canons are aspirational in nature); Wolfram, The Code of ProfessionalResponsibility as a Measure of Attorney Liability in Civil Litigation, 30 S.C.L. REV. 281, 284 (1979)(canons are vague,
axiomatic norms).
3. See Sales, The Texas Disciplinary Roles of Professional Conduct: A Model to Replace
the Outdated Texas Code of Professional Responsibility, 52 TEX. B.J. 388, 388 (ethical considerations are discretionary moral choices not governed by disciplinary rules); Wolfram, The
Code of Professional Responsibility as a Measure of Attorney Liability in Civil Litigation, 30
S.C.L. REV. 291, 294 (1979)(ethical considerations serve to give moral advice concerning preferred rather than mandatory behavior).
4. See TEXAS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT preamble, Scope, at paragraph 10
(Rules are imperatives cast in terms of "shall" or "shall not"). Compliance with the Rules
shall be enforced through disciplinary procedures when necessary. Id. at paragraph 11. See
generally Sales, The Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct: A Model to Replace the
Outdated Texas Code of Professional Responsibility, 52 TEX. B.J. 388, 388 (1989)(discussion of
difference between canons, ethical considerations, and disciplinary rules and need to adopt
Rules). Disciplinary rules are mandatory, clearly delineating the minimum standard of conduct for lawyers. If a lawyer's conduct is below that prescribed by such rules, the lawyer is
subject to disciplinary action. Id.
5. TEXAS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT preamble, Scope, at paragraph 10.
6. Id. at paragraph 15. The complete disclaimer providing that the Rules do not establish
a standard for civil liability is as follows:
These rules do not undertake to define standards of civil liability of lawyers for professional conduct. Violation of a rule does not give rise to a private cause of action nor does
it create any presumption that a legal duty to a client has been breached. Likewise, these
rules are not designed to be standards for procedural decisions. Furthermore, the purpose
of these rules can be abused when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural
weapons. The fact that a rule is a just basis for a lawyer's self-assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a disciplinary authority, does not imply that an
antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction has standing to seek enforcement of
the rule. Accordingly, nothing in the rules should be deemed to augment any substantive
legal duty of lawyers or the extra-disciplinary consequences of violating such a duty.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol21/iss3/5

2

Medina and Coyle: Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct: Additional Liab

1990]

DISCIPLINAR Y R ULES

Rules to be that of defining standards of professional conduct for disciplinary purposes only, was neither strong enough nor clear enough.7
Therefore, although intended in a broad sense for the protection of
the public, 8 neither the Rules nor their predecessor, the Texas Code of
Professional Responsibility ("Code"), were designed to define standards of civil liability. 9 The purpose of the Rules, rather, is to define
proper conduct within the scope of a lawyer's place as a guardian of
the law, and his/her relationship with, and function in, the legal system.'" A breach of a disciplinary rule, similar to a breach of a procedural rule, is intended to provide a public remedy only, not a private
one. 11
7. See

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-

DUCT: THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES

21 (1987)(documentation

of Rules as originally proposed and Rules as adopted along with discussion pertaining to
changes made). The paragraph contained in the Scope which was the basis for Texas Rules,
preamble: Scope, paragraph 15, was changed to more clearly show that the Model Rules were
intended to regulate conduct through the disciplinary process only, not as a standard for civil
liability. The original, with subsequent changes is as follows (original text, later deleted, is in
all-caps; text added is italicized):
Violation of a Rule should not ITSELF give rise to a cause of action nor should it create
any presumption that aN INDEPENDENT legal duty has been breached. The Rules are
designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct
through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability. Furthermore, the purpose of the Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing
parties as procedural weapons. The fact that a Rule is a just basis for a lawyer's selfassessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a disciplinary authority, does not imply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction has standing to seek enforcement of the Rule. Accordingly, nothing in the Rules should be deemed
to augment any substantive legal duty of lawyers or the extra-disciplinaryconsequences of
violating such a duty.
Id. at 21.
8. See C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 3.4.2, at 101 (1986)(purpose of disciplining lawyer is to protect public and future clients). The legal disciplinary procedure is not
intended to be a substitute for civil proceedings which resolve interpersonal disputes. Id.
9. See Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763, 770 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978,
writ ref'd n.r.e.)(violation of disciplinary rule does not in itself create private cause of action).
See generally R. MALLEN & J. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 6.27, at 355-56 (3d ed.
1989)(general discussion about purpose of ethical regulations).

10.

TEXAS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

preamble, A Lawyer's Responsibilities,

at paragraph 1.
11. See Martin, 578 S.W.2d at 770 (private cause of action not created when disciplinary
rule violated); accord Miami Int'l Realty v. Paynter, 841 F.2d 348, 353 (10th Cir. 1988)(use of
Code to establish violation as negligence per se improper); Terry Cove North v. Marr & Friedlander, 521 So. 2d 22, 23 (Ala. 1988)(Code is designed to establish remedy which is disciplinary in nature only); see also R. MALLEN & J. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 15.7, at 880
(3d ed. 1989)(neither Code nor Rules intended to establish standard of civil liability for
attorneys).
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Despite the disclaimer, however, many Texas lawyers fear the
Rules will be used either as an independent basis for liability, or as a
standard of care in malpractice litigation. This article will address
some specific areas where the Rules could arguably be used either as a
standard of care or as an independent basis for liability. The topics
discussed are merely examples and are not intended to be exhaustive
or all-inclusive by any means. The article does not profess to provide
conclusive answers because there are no conclusive answers. Instead,
after raising questions as to how the Rules may affect liability for lawyers in Texas, the article will provide an overview of the role comparable versions of disciplinary rules have played in malpractice actions
in other jurisdictions as well as Texas and predict how the Rules will
be utilized in Texas.
II.

POTENTIAL FOR ADDITIONAL LIABILITY?

Although the preamble to the Rules limits their scope to that of
defining proper conduct for purposes of professional discipline only
on its face,1 2 some of the Code-to-Rule changes raise the question as
to whether the newly adopted, mandated standard of behavior actually creates new types of, or defines standards for, professional
liability.
A.

Rule 1.05: Confidentiality of Information
Confidentiality of information 3 as described in the Rules includes
both "privileged information" (that which is protected by the lawyer12. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
13. TEXAS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.05. Confidentiality of Information, provides:
(a) 'Confidential information' includes both 'privileged information' and 'unprivileged
client information.' 'Privileged information' refers to the information of a client protected
by the lawyer-client privilege of Rule 503 of the Texas Rules of Evidence or of Rule 503 of
the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence or by the principles of attorney-client privilege
governed by Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and
Magistrates. 'Unprivileged client information' means all information relating to a client
or furnished by the client, other than privileged information, acquired by the lawyer during the course of or by reason of the representation of the client.
(b) Except as permitted by paragraphs (c) and (d), or as required by paragraphs (e),
and (h), a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) Reveal confidential information of a client or a former client to:
(i) a person that the client has instructed is not to receive the information; or
(ii) anyone else, other than the client, the client's representatives, or the members, associates, or employees of the lawyer's law firm.
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client privilege) and "unprivileged client information" (all other information relating to a client obtained as a result of the relationship).' 4
(2) Use confidential information of a client to the disadvantage of the client unless
the client consents after consultation.
(3) Use confidential information of a former client to the disadvantage of the former client after the representation is concluded unless the former client consents
after consultation or the confidential information has become generally known.
(4) Use privileged information of a client for the advantage of the lawyer or of a
third person, unless the client consents after consultation.
(c) A lawyer may reveal confidential information:
(1) When the lawyer has been expressly authorized to do so in order to carry out
the representation.

(2) When the client consents after consultation.
(3) To the client, client's representatives, or the members, associates, and employees of the lawyer's firm, except when otherwise instructed by the client.
(4) When the lawyer has reason to believe it is necessary to so in order to comply
with a court order, a Texas Rule of Professional Conduct, or other law.
(5) To the extent reasonably necessary to enforce a claim or establish a defense on
behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client.
(6) To establish a defense to a criminal charge, civil claim or disciplinary complaint against the lawyer or the lawyer's associates based upon the conduct involving
the client or the representation of the client.
(7) When the lawyer has reason to believe it is necessary to do so in order to
prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act.
(8) To the extent revelation reasonably appears necessary to rectify the consequences of a client's criminal or fraudulent act in the commission of which the lawyer's services had been used.
(d) A lawyer may also reveal unprivileged client information:
(1) When impliedly authorized to so in order to carry out the representation.
(2) When the lawyer has reason to believe it is necessary to do so in order to:
(i) carry out the representation effectively;
(ii) defend the lawyer or the lawyer's employees or associates against a claim
of wrongful conduct;
(iii) respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client; or
(iv) prove the services rendered to a client, or the reasonable value thereof, or
both, in an action against another person or organization responsible for the payment of the fee for services rendered to the client.
(e) When a lawyer has confidential information clearly establishing that a client is
likely to commit a criminal or fraudulent act that is likely to result in death or substantial
bodily harm to a person, the lawyer shall reveal confidential information to the extent
revelation reasonably appears necessary to prevent the client from committing the criminal or fraudulent act.
(f) A lawyer shall reveal confidential information when required to do so by Rule
3.03(a)(2), 3.03(b), or by Rule 4.01(b).
Id.
14. Id. Rule 1.05(a).
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With a few limited exceptions,I5 the Rule prohibits a lawyer from revealing any confidential information, even unprivileged client information, without the client's or former client's consent. This
prohibition is stronger than the provision in the Rule's predecessor,
the Code, which limited a lawyer from revealing non-confidential information only when the client had requested the information not be
revealed or when the disclosure would result in embarrassment to or
be detrimental to the client.' 6
15. Id. Rule 1.05(c)-(f). The Rule provides that confidential information may be disclosed as follows:
(c) A lawyer may reveal confidential information:
(I) When the lawyer has been expressly authorized to do so in order to carry out
the representation.
(2) When the client consents after consultation.
(3) To the client, the client's representatives, or the members, associates, and employees of the lawyer's firm, except when otherwise instructed by the client.
(4) When the lawyer has reason to believe it is necessary to so in order to comply
with a court order, a Texas Rule of Professional Conduct, or other law.
(5) To the extent reasonably necessary to enforce a claim or establish a defense on
behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client.
(6) To establish a defense to a criminal charge, civil claim or disciplinary complaint against the lawyer or the lawyer's associates based upon the conduct involving
the client or the representation of the client.
(7) When the lawyer has reason to believe it is necessary to do so in order to
prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act.
(8) To the extent revelation reasonably appears necessary to rectify the consequences of a client's criminal or fraudulent act in the commission of which the lawyer's services had been used.
(d) A lawyer may also reveal unprivileged client information:
(1) When impliedly authorized to so in order to carry out the representation.
(2) When the lawyer has reason to believe it is necessary to do so in order to:
(i) carry out the representation effectively;
(ii) defend the lawyer or the lawyer's employees or associates against a claim of
wrongful conduct;
(iii) respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client; or
(iv) prove the services rendered to a client, or the reasonable value thereof, or
both, in an action against another person or organization responsible for the payment of the fee for services rendered to the client.
(e) When a lawyer has confidential information clearly establishing that a client is likely
to commit a criminal or fraudulent act that is likely to result in death or substantial bodily
harm to a person, the lawyer shall reveal confidential information to the extent revelation
reasonably appears necessary to prevent the client from committing the criminal or fraudulent act.
(f) A lawyer shall reveal confidential information when required to do so by Rule
3.03(a)(2), 3.03(b), or by Rule 4.01(b).
Id.

16. Compare TEXAS

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
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In at least one area of practice-that of insurance defense-there is
a fear that the increased restriction on disclosure will result in a comparable increase in civil liability. Mr. Victor Anderson, Jr. 17 uses the
following example to illustrate how the change in the Rules could
affect lawyers who practice insurance defense. Picture an insurance
defense attorney investigating the accident scene at a client's factory
or manufacturing plant. While touring the factory, the attorney notices that certain safety shields or switches have been removed from
the equipment the injured worker was using at the time of the accident. This information will almost surely be developed by the plaintiff
during the discovery process, yet the attorney for the insured is prevented from disclosing the same information because it was acquired
during the representation. The client, for various reasons, refuses to
consent to the disclosure of the information. While the information
warrants a recommendation for settlement, the insurance company
refuses to settle because the attorney is unable to disclose the information upon which the recommendation is based. As a result, the insurance company is held liable for a far larger amount in damages after
the case has been litigated than it would have been had the parties
settled. Read strictly, Anderson points out, Rule 1.05 prohibits the
disclosure of public as well as non-public information acquired as a
result of the representation.' 8 Therefore, the information concerning
the safety equipment in the above example could not be disclosed to
the insurance company even if it were developed during depositions.
B.

Rule 5.01: Responsibilities of a Partneror Supervisory Lawyer
Rule 5.01 specifically subjects a partner and/or supervisory lawyer

information includes privileged and unprivileged client information) with SUPREME COURT OF
TEXAS, RULES GOVERNING THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS art. X, § 9 (Code of Professional
Resposibility) DR-4-101 (1988) [hereinafter TEXAS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPOSIBILITY]

(confidential information means privileged information). DR-4-101 provides:
'Confidence' refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege under applica-

ble law, and 'secret' refers to other information gained in the professional relationship that
the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing
or would be likely to be detrimentalto the client.
Id. (emphasis added).
17. Mr. Anderson is with Shannon, Gracey, Ratliff& Miller in Fort Worth, Texas, and is
the Chairman of District 7A Grievance Committee. The authors thank Mr. Victor Anderson,
Jr., for sharing his concern that the Rules may result in additional liability and for providing
this hypothetical of how that liability might arise.
18. See TEXAS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.05 (nothing in rule distinguishes between public and private information).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

7

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 21 [2022], No. 3, Art. 5

ST. MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:733

to discipline under two circumstances. 19 First, the lawyer may be disciplined for ordering, encouraging, or knowingly allowing conduct of
a subordinate lawyer which violates the Rules.2 ° Second, the same
partner or lawyer with direct supervisory responsibility may be subject to discipline if no remedial action is taken which avoids or mitigates the consequences of the violation, once the violation becomes
known to the supervising lawyer. 2 ' This rule may sound like welcome
relief to entering associates who find themselves with assignments
which they feel, for some reason, would result in a violation of the
Rules. A supervised lawyer, however, is still bound by the Rules,
even when acting under the direct supervision of another lawyer.2 2
The supervised lawyer is entitled to this defense in a disciplinary proceeding only when it appears that the lawyer acted according to the
resolution to "an arguable question of
supervisory lawyer's reasonable
23
professional conduct.
The rule is clear that the partner or supervisory lawyer must have
knowledge of the supervised lawyer's violation in order to be subject
to discipline. 24 Theoretically, this prevents the notion of "vicarious"
disciplinary liability. As in the preamble to the Rules, the comments
following Rule 5.01 state that it is not within the scope of the Rules to
determine whether a partner or supervisory lawyer may be held civilly

19. Id. Rule 5.01. The Rule reads as follows:
A lawyer shall be subject to discipline because of another lawyer's violation of these
rules of professional conduct if:

(a) The lawyer is a partner or supervising lawyer and orders, encourages, or knowingly
permits the conduct involved; or
(b) The lawyer is a partner in the law firm in which the other lawyer practices, is the
general counsel of a government agency's legal department in which the other lawyer is
employed, or has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and with knowledge
of the other lawyer's violation of these rules knowingly fails to take reasonable remedial

action to avoid or mitigate the consequences of the other lawyer's violation.
Id.
20. Id. Rule 5.01(a).
21. Id. 5.01(b).
22. See TEXAS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.02 (outlines responsibilities of
supervised lawyer). The Rule provides: "A lawyer is bound by these rules notwithstanding
that the lawyer acted under the supervision of another person, except that a supervised lawyer
does not violate these rules if that lawyer acts in accordance with a supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional conduct." Id.
23. Id.; see also TEXAS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.02, comment 3 (limits use of defense).
24. TEXAS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.01, comment 5 (supervisory attorney exposed to liability only for knowing actions or omissions).
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or criminally liable for the conduct of a supervised lawyer. 25 It is
difficult to imagine, however, that a finding by a grievance committee
that Rule 5.01 was violated would not be considered in a civil or criminal action alleging a partner or supervisory lawyer to be vicariously
liable for the conduct of the supervised lawyer.
C.

Rule 1.04: Fee Setting
The factors listed in the Rules which may be considered in setting a

fee 26 are not very different from the factors included in the Code.2
25. Id. (supervisory attorney not vicariously liable under rule).
26. Id. Rule 1.04. The Rule, addressing legal fees, provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect an illegal fee or
unconscionable fee. A fee is unconscionable if a competent lawyer could not form a reasonable belief that the fee is reasonable.
(b) Factors that may be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include,
but not to the exclusion of other relevant factors, the following:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular
employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the
services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or uncertainty of
collection before the legal services have been rendered.
(c) When the lawyer has not regularly represented the client, the basis or rate of the fee
shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable
time after commencing the representation.
(d) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is
rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (e) or
other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and shall state the method by
which the fee is to be determined. If there is to be a differentiation in the percentage or
percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal, the
percentage for each shall be stated. The agreement shall state the litigation and other
expenses to be deducted from the recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted
before or after the contingent fee is calculated. Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement describing the outcome of
the matter and, if there is a recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the method
of its determination.
(e) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect a contingent fee
for representing a defendant in a criminal case.
(f) A division or agreement for division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the
same firm shall not be made unless:
(1) the division is:
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Utilization of these factors to determine whether a fee is appropriate,
however, could have some far-reaching effects.
In some disciplinary districts, 28 lawyers involved in fee disputes
with clients may elect to have the dispute resolved via arbitration by a
fee dispute committee either before a formal grievance or as an alternative to a formal grievance. These committees, though recognized
by the State Bar, are separate and distinct entities from the grievance
committees themselves. As a result, their procedures are not governed by the Bar, nor are their decisions binding on the parties.
Similar to the grievance committees, the fee dispute committees
look to disciplinary rules for guidance to determine whether the fees
in question are appropriate. The liability question arises once a com(i) in proportion to the professional services performed by each lawyer;
(ii) made with a forwarding lawyer; or
(iii) made, by written agreement with the client, with a lawyer who assumes
joint responsibility for the representation;
(2) the client is advised of, and does not object to, the participation of all the
lawyers involved; and
(3) the aggregate fee does not violate paragraph (a).
(g) Paragraph (f) of this Rule does not prohibit payment to a former partner or associate pursuant to a separation or retirement agreement.
Id.

27. CompareTEXAS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106 (factors to consider when setting fees) with TEXAS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.04 (factors to
consider to determine if fee reasonable). The DR 2-106 provides:
(A) A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal or
clearly excessive fee.
(B) A fee is clearly excessive when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary
prudence would be left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a
reasonable fee. Factors to be considered as guides in determining the reasonableness of a
fee include the following:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular
employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the
services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
(C) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect a contingent
fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.

DR 2-106.
28. District 9 in Austin, for example, utilizes a fee dispute committee.

TEXAS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
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mittee has determined a fee to be inappropriate or excessive based on
the criteria included in the Rules. It is questionable whether this finding would be admissible in a subsequent action under the Deceptive
Trade Practices Act as proof of unconscionability. 29
D.

Rule 7.01: Communication Concerning a Lawyer's Services

The liberalization of rules pertaining to lawyer advertising3" is relatively new; therefore, the regulation of legal advertising is also new
29. See infra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
30. TEXAS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.01. The Rule provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the qualifications or the services of any lawyer or law firm. A statement is false or misleading if it:
(1) Contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary
to make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading. Any statement about fees must include the amount of the fee, whether contingent or otherwise,
and must state whether the client may be obligated for all or for some portion of the
costs involved;
(2) Is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the lawyer can
achieve, or states or implies that the lawyer can achieve results by means that violate
these rules or other law;
(3) Compares the lawyer's services with other lawyers' services, unless the comparison can be factually substantiated; or
(4) States or implies that the lawyer is able to influence improperly or upon irrelevant grounds any tribunal, legislative body, or public official.
(b) A lawyer shall not advertise publicly that the lawyer is a specialist, except as permitted under Rule 7.01(c) or as follows:
(1) A lawyer admitted to practice before the United States Patent Office may use
the designation 'Patents,' 'Patent Attorney,' or 'Patent Lawyer', or any combination
of those terms. A lawyer engaged in the trademark practice may use the designation
'Trademark,' 'Trademark Attorney,' or 'Trademark Lawyer,' or any combination of
those terms. A lawyer engaged in patent and trademark practice may hold himself
out as specializing in 'Intellectual Property Law,' 'Patents, or Trademarks and Related Matters,' or 'Patent, Trademark, Copyright Law and Unfair Competition' or
any of those terms.
(2) A lawyer may permit his name to be listed in lawyer referral service offices
according to the areas of law in which he will accept referrals.
(3) A lawyer available to practice in a particular area of law or legal service may
distribute to other lawyers and publish in legal directories a dignified announcement
of such availability, but the announcement shall not contain a representation of special competence or experience.
(c) A lawyer who advertises through public media with regard to any area of the law in
which the lawyer practices shall:
(1) With respect to each area of law so advertised, publish or broadcast the name
of the lawyer, licensed to practice in Texas, who shall be responsible for the performance of the legal service in the area of law so advertised.
(2) If the lawyer has been awarded a Certificate of Special Competence by the
Texas Board of Legal Specialization in the area so advertised, state with respect to
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and still developing. In fact, there are few, if any, guidelines available
to Texas lawyers regarding advertising. As a result, legal advertising
raises a great many questions which have not yet been answered.
The overall rule is simple enough: advertising can be neither false
nor misleading. 3' The difficulty arises when interpreting the rule. For
example: What is "misleading"? Misleading to whom-the con-

each area, 'Board Certified, (area of specialization) - Texas Board of Legal Specialization.'
(3) If the lawyer has not been awarded a Certificate of Special Competence by the
Texas Board of Legal Specialization in the area so advertised, state with respect to
each area, 'Not Certified by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization,' but if the area
of law so advertised has not been designated as an area in which a lawyer may be
awarded a certificate of special competence by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization, the lawyer may also state, 'No designation has been made by the Texas Board of
Legal Specialization for a Certificate of Special Competence in this area.'
(d) The statements referred to in paragraph (c) shall be displayed conspicuously so as
to be easily seen or understood by any consumer.
(e) Subject to the requirements of paragraphs (a), (b), (c), and (d), a lawyer may, either
directly or through a public relations or advertising representative, advertise services
through public media, such as a telephone directory, legal directory, newspaper or other
periodical, outdoor display, radio or television.
(f) A lawyer shall not send a written communication to a prospective client for the
purpose of obtaining professional employment if:
(1) The lawyer knows or reasonably should know the person could not exercise
reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer;
(2) The person has made known to the lawyer a desire not to receive communications from the lawyer;
(3) The communication involves coercion, duress or harassment;
(4) The communication contains information prohibited by paragraphs (a) or (b);
or

(5) The communication fails to comply with the requirements of paragraphs (c)
and (d).
(g) All advertisements for a lawyer or law firm and all written communications to a
prospective client for the purpose of obtaining professional employment must be reviewed
and approved in writing by the lawyer or a lawyer in the law firm.
(h) A copy or recording of each advertisement, written communication, and relevant
approval referred to in paragraph (g), and a record of when and where the advertisement
or communication was used, shall be kept by the lawyer or law firm for four years after its
last dissemination.
(i) A lawyer shall not give or promise to give anything of value to a lay person for
referring clients or potential clients to any lawyer or law firm; however, a lawyer may pay
reasonable fees for advertising and public relations service rendered in accordance with
this Rule and may pay the usual charges and otherwise cooperate with organizations that
refer clients if the organization does not profit from the rendition of legal services by
lawyers.
Id.
31. TEXAS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.01(a).
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sumer or the grievance committee?3 2 How prominent must the
"Board Certified" or "Not Certified" be in an ad to be sufficiently
"conspicuous"? 3 In TV ads, must the designation be aural as well as
visual to satisfy the requirement that it be "easily seen or understood
by any consumer"? 34 If a visual designation alone is sufficient, how
long should the words remain on the screen?
Although a false advertisement for legal services may be sufficient
to give rise to a malpractice claim, it is less likely that a misleading
statement would do so. What will the result be, however, if a grievance committee finds a lawyer's advertising to be misleading to the
public?
One purpose of advertising, of course, is to inform consumers about
the availability of legal services. The consumer depending on the advertising to hire a lawyer however, has no personal remedy through
the disciplinary process if the advertising is false or misleading. 35 Several commentators suggest that while disciplinary action is important
to maintain the integrity of the profession, another, more appropriate
avenue exists to deter false and misleading advertising--consumer
protection statutes.3 6
E. Deceptive Trade PracticesAct
As a rule, the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protec32. See Devine, Letting the Market ControlAdvertising by Lawyers: A Suggested Remedy
for the Misled Client, 31 BUFFALO L. REV. 351, 357-58 (1982)(consumer protection laws are
best means to deter false advertising). The commentator states that consumer protection statutes such as the DTPA are the most appropriate means of dealing with lawyer advertising in
particular because "misleading" and "deceptive" should be determined from the perspective of
the consumer (subjective standard) rather than the perspective of the reasonable attorney or
grievance committee (objective standard). Id. at 370.
33. TEXAS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.01(c)-(d).
34. Id. Rule 7.01(d).
35. See Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763, 770 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978,
writ ref'd n.r.e.)(private cause of action not created as result of disciplinary rules being violated); see also R. MALLEN & J. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 1.9, at 33 (3d ed. 1989)(client
is not party to disciplinary proceeding although proceeding may be initiated by client); Id.
§ 6.27, at 355 (although disciplinary regulations designed to protect public they do not provide
remedy for wrongdoing in themselves).
36. Id. § 4.11, at 259 n.8 (predicts attorneys will be held liable for implied promise made
in advertising); see also Devine, Letting the Market Control Advertising by Lawyers: A Suggested Remedy for the Misled Client 31 BUFFALO L. REV. 351, 357-58 (1982)(consumer protection statutes are best deterrent to false and misleading legal advertising); Marcotte, New
Threat to Attorneys?, 74 A.B.A. J. 17, 17-18 (Dec. 1988)(trend toward consumer protection
threatens attorneys with consumer fraud lawsuits).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

13

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 21 [2022], No. 3, Art. 5

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:733

tion Act ("DTPA") 37 is a strict liability statute and does not require a
showing of fault. 38 Although the statute exempts physicians and
health care providers from DTPA claims which allege negligent conduct, 39 a similar amendment which proposed excluding professional
services in general was tabled.' The extent to which the DTPA does
apply to lawyers and legal services, however, is a relatively new and
still developing topic.
In 1980, the Houston Court of Appeals ruled that the DTPA applied to the purchase of legal services in DeBakey v. Staggs.4 In the
per curium opinion, the Texas Supreme Court stated that while it
agreed that the respondents were consumers under the DTPA, the
question "as to the standard of care by which a legal malpractice
claim is to be determined" was expressly reserved for future determination.42 Subsequent decisions concerning DTPA allegations against
attorneys have done little to provide insight as to whether or not the
statute can be construed to alter the standard of care in a legal mal37. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon 1989) (Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices & Consumer Protection Act "DTPA"). It is beyond the scope and intent of this
article to discuss the DTPA and DTPA actions in general.
38. Id. § 17.46(a). False, misleading, and deceptive acts and practices are prohibited in
the conduct of any trade or commerce. The act includes no requirement that the acts or
practices be intentionally false, misleading, or deceptive. Id.; see also Wagner v. Morris, 658
S.W.2d 230, 233 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ)(misrepresentation actionable
under DTPA even without intent to deceive).
39. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art 4590i, § 12.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1989). The section
provides:
Notwithstanding any other law, no provisions of Sections 17.41-17.63 Business & Commerce Code, [DTPA] shall apply to physicians or health care providers as defined in
Section 1.03(3) of this Act, with respect to claims for damages for personal injury or death
resulting, or alleged to have resulted, from negligence on the part of any physician or
health care provider.
Id.
40. H.J. OF TEX., 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess. 2115, 2115 (1973)(proposed amendment to
§ 17.49). The amendment, as proposed, read: "(c) No provision of this Act shall apply to any
individual practicing his or her profession only licensed by the State of Texas to practice a
recognized profession in this state." Id.
41. 605 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1980) writ ref'd n.r.e. per
curium, 612 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. 1981). Attorney DeBakey was retained to perform the work
required to change the name of Mrs. Staggs' daughter (Mr. Staggs' step-daughter). Although
the original petition was filed and the cause was heard, the final order was never signed because
of various insufficiencies and defects. As a result, the Staggs hired a second attorney to complete the proceeding. This suit was then filed against DeBakey, alleging damages in the
amount of the retainer paid plus the additional costs incurred as a result of hiring the second
attorney. DeBakey, 605 S.W.2d at 632.
42. DeBakey, 612 S.W.2d at 925.
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practice claim. It is equally unclear whether an attorney can be found
liable under the DTPA to third parties.4 3 The cases, however, have
indicated that lawyers can be found liable under the DTPA for unconscionable acts," and for violations of the "laundry list."'45

43. Compare First Mun. Leasing Corp. v. Blankenship, 648 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(question of whether plaintiff a consumer within meaning
of DTPA is based on whether plaintiff is client who purchased or leased legal services from
attorney) with Parker v. Carnahan, 772 S.W.2d 151, 158 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, writ
requested)(purchase made for benefit of third party makes third party a consumer within
meaning of DTPA). In Blankenship, the plaintiff secured financing for political subdivisions
and municipal corporations by purchasing their installment and lease/purchase obligations.
Blankenship, 648 S.W.2d at 412. Following the purchase, the plaintiff would then sell the
obligation to third party investors. Pursuant to the negotiation of one such deal, the investor
required the plaintiff to obtain a legal opinion concerning the legality of the contract obligation
being purchased (which the plaintiff had purchased from System Works). The plaintiff requested System Works to obtain the requested opinion; System Works in turn hired Blankenship, et al to provide the opinion letter. Although the letter was subsequently provided to the
plaintiff, System Works paid for the legal services and the opinion was addressed and submitted only to them. Id. The court concluded that the plaintiff was not a consumer within the
meaning of DTPA because it neither purchased nor leased the legal services in question. Id. at
417. The court additionally concluded that even if the plaintiff had qualified as a consumer
under the DTPA, it was not adversely affected by the letter because the plaintiff did not receive
the letter until a week after it had entered into the assignment with System Works. Id. at 418.
In Parker,a woman brought suit against her former husband's attorneys, alleging among other
things that they had violated the DTPA by failing to tell her of the potential liability which
could result from her signing a joint tax return. Parker, 772 S.W.2d at 153. The court cited
Blankenship for the premise that "a non-client generally has no cause of action against an
attorney for the negligent performance of legal work." Id. at 156. The court then stated that
Mrs. Parker did not appear to qualify as a consumer under the DTPA because the legal services in question were provided solely for her former husband. Id. Citing Kennedy v. Sale,
however, the court acknowledged that a third party may be a consumer within the meaning of
the DTPA if the purchase in question was made for the benefit of the third party and that the
goods or services so purchased form the basis of the complaint. Id. at 158. After finding that
Mrs. Parker was not precluded from being a consumer within the meaning of the DTPA, the
court ruled the evidence presented was nonetheless insufficient to establish such a violation.
Id. at 159; see also Kennedy v. Sale, 689 S.W.2d 890, 892-93 (Tex. 1985)(plaintiff can be consumer within meaning of DTPA when goods or services acquired for plaintiff's benefit).
44. DeBakey, 612 S.W.2d at 925 (attorney's actions were unconscionable under DTPA);
see also Barnard v. Mecom, 650 S.W.2d 123, 126 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, writ ref'd
n.r.e.)(evidence sufficient to find attorney committed unconscionable act in violation of
DTPA); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(5) (Vernon 1987)(definition of unconscionable action). But see Lucas v. Nesbitt, 653 S.W.2d 883, 886 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983,
writ ref'd n.r.e.)(evidence insufficient to show attorney's actions unconscionable under
DTPA).
45. Cf. Heath v. Herron, 732 S.W.2d 748, 754 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist] 1987,
writ denied)(announcement of "ready" in court insufficient to give rise to DTPA claim for
misrepresentation). Although the court recognized that legal services could be found actionable under the DTPA, it was unwilling to find that an announcement of "ready" in court constituted a claim under the DTPA if the attorney was subsequently unsuccessful. Id.; see also
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One particular area of DTPA liability which has not yet been specifically applied to legal services is a breach of implied warranty.
While "warranty" is not defined in the statute, caselaw has clearly

established that any DTPA liability for breach of warranty must be
for a warranty established independently of the statute itself.46
Although the question of implied warranty has not been expressly answered by the supreme court in connection with legal services per se,
the court has addressed the issue in relation to other professional
services.
In Dennis v. Allison, the supreme court addressed the issue of
whether a psychiatrist could be found liable for breach of an implied
warranty to follow the ethical commands of his profession. The
court declined to create such a cause of action, basing its decision on
the fact that the plaintiff had other more appropriate remedies readily
available to her.48
Two years later, in Melody Home Manufacturing Co. v. Barnes,4 9
the court found that service providers who repair existing tangible
goods or property impliedly warrant that the services "will be performed in a good and workmanlike manner"; and that a breach of
such implied warranty was actionable under the DTPA.5 ° Although
the original opinion issued in Melody Home ruled that a similar implied warranty was applicable to professional services as well,5" the
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46 (Vernon 1987)("laundry list" of false, misleading, or
deceptive acts and practices prohibited under DTPA).
46. La Sara Grain Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Mercedes, 673 S.W.2d 558, 565 (Tex.
1984)(because DTPA does not define "warranty" it must be established outside Act)).
47. 698 S.W.2d 94, 94 (Tex. 1985). The plaintiff had sued her psychiatrist after he beat
her physically and sexually assaulted her during treatment. The only theory of recovery preserved for review was whether the defendant had breached an implied warranty to adhere to
the ethical commandments of his profession. Id.
48. Id. at 96 (court ruled no need to find implied warranty because plaintiff had other
equally adequate means available to redress wrongs committed). The remedies identified by
the court which would be more appropriate for the plaintiff to use were those of assault and
battery, and medical malpractice. Id. at 95-96.
49. 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987).
50. Id. at 355. The Barneses purchased a pre-fabricated modular home from Melody
Home in 1979. Id. at 351. Over the next several years, they noticed dampness and puddles in
the home and eventually discovered a sink was not correctly connected to a drain. Although
workers from Melody Home made two attempts to repair the problem, the repairs did not
alleviate the problem, and in fact, added to the damage. Id.
51. Melody Home Mfg. v. Barnes, 30 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 489, 491 (June 17, 1987), opinion
withdrawn and new opinion substituted, 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. 1987). In the first Melody Home
opinion, the Texas Supreme Court reasoned that "[t]he policies supporting the recognition of
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court modified the breadth of its decision in its second opinion, stating
that the "question [of] whether an implied warranty applies to services in which the essence of the transaction is the exercise of professional judgment by the service provider is not before us." 2
While it is not certain that legal services include an implied warranty that the services will be performed in a good and workmanlike
manner, it is equally uncertain that they do not include such a warranty. In Willis v. Maverick,5 3 a client brought a malpractice and
DTPA action against her divorce attorney.5 4 The Texas Supreme
Court ruled affirmatively on the ultimate issue, holding the discovery
rule to be applicable in legal malpractice cases.5 5 Recovery, however,
was denied because error had not been properly preserved. 6 Finding
there was no need to reach the DTPA cause of action, the court then
concluded "[the] determination of whether a lawyer's professional
conduct is actionable under the DTPA must await another day."5 7
Should the Texas Supreme Court eventually rule that legal services
include an implied warranty, it is unclear what specific actions would
give rise to creating an implied warranty: A violation of the Rules?
An ad stating that the lawyer will "fight for you"? A collection of
news clippings shown to a prospective client which highlight previous
big-dollar jury awards?58 What is certain is that if such a warranty is
found, a breach of the warranty would be actionable under the
DTPA.

an implied warranty for services such as repairs apply equally to 'professional' services." Id. at
491. As a result, Dennis v. Allison was overruled in the first opinion. Id.
52. Melody Home, 741 S.W.2d at 354.
53. 760 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. 1988).
54. See id. at 643 (malpractice and DTPA action against divorce attorney). The ultimate
issue in the malpractice/DTPA action was whether the discovery rule is applicable in malpractice actions for the purpose of determining when the statute of limitations begins to run. Id. at
646.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 647-48. The court ruled that because Mrs. Willis had failed to adequately plead
and prove discovery of the action as a bar to the statute of limitations, it was unnecessary to
decide whether the DTPA claim was applicable. Nonetheless, the court then proceeded to
discuss the status of DTPA causes of actions relative to legal services. The court stated that
while it had ruled an attorney may be held liable under the DTPA for unconscionable conduct,
it as yet had declined to expand implied warranties to include all professional conduct. Id.
57. Id. at 647-48.
58. See R. MALLEN & J. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 8.6, at 418 (3d ed. 1989)(risk of
warranty liability to clients expected to increase because expansion of marketing of legal services increases likelihood of predicting results and overstating ability).
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OTHER JURISDICTIONS

Courts in other jurisdictions have often cited ethical rules and standards, but they seldom make clear reference as to whether the rules
define the standard of care, provide an independent basis for liability,
or simply suggest appropriate conduct.59 Generally, a violation of a
rule of professional conduct has been insufficient to hold an attorney
liable in a malpractice action.' One commentator has noted, however, that nothing prohibits the use of disciplinary rules as a guide
when evaluating a lawyer's conduct in malpractice actions. 6 1
Neither commentators nor courts agree as to the relationship of
ethical violations and malpractice actions. 62 Some argue that violation of an ethical regulation is "some evidence" of negligence; 63 others
that a violation is negligence per se. 6 Still others have ruled that
59. Id. § 15.7, at 880-82 (3d ed. 1989)(use of ethical standards in actions against attorneys). See generally Podgor, CriminalMisconduct: Ethical Rule Usage Leads to Regulation of
the Legal Profession, 61 TEMP. L.Q. 1323, 1333 (1988)(discussion of use of ethical regulations
in civil proceedings).
60. See Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763, 770 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978,
writ ref'd n.r.e.)(violation of disciplinary rule insufficient in itself to create a private cause of
action); accord Terry Cove North, Inc. v. Marr, 521 So. 2d 22, 24 (Ala. 1988)(Code does not
define standards for civil liability). See generally R. MALLEN & J. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE §§ 1.9, 6.27, 15.7 (3d ed. 1989)(discussion of the relationship between ethical standards,
disciplinary proceedings and civil liability); C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 2.6.1, at
52-53 (1986)(discussion of how lawyer codes of professional conduct have been applied
judicially).
61. C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 2.6.1, at 52 (1986)(nothing in Code suggests it inappropriate for courts to use Code for guidance in determining measure of civil
liability); see also Wolfram, The Code of ProfessionalResponsibility As A Measure of Attorney
Liability In Civil Litigation, 30 S.C.L. REV. 281, 286-95 (1979)(reasons Code should be used as
basis for civil liability).
62. Compare Faure & Strong, The Model Rules ofProfessionalConduct: No Standardfor
Malpractice, 47 MONT. L. REV. 363 (1986)(discussion of reasons Rules are inappropriate as
standards for civil liability) and Hoover, The Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Lawyer
MalpracticeActions: The Gap Between Code and Common Law Narrows, 22 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 595 (1988)(concern that, in effect, Rules are becoming standards for civil liability) with
Wolfram, The Code of Professional Responsiblity As A Measure of Attorney Liability in Civil
Litigation, 30 S.C.L. REV. 281, 284 (1979)(advocates Rules being used as standard for civil
liability) and Note, The Rules of Professional Conduct: Basisfor Civil Liability of Attorneys, 39
U. FLA. L. REV. 777 (1987)(discussion of pros and cons in utilizing Rules as standard for civil
liability).
63. Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924, 936 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888
(1980)(Code provides some evidence of standard of care for attorneys).
64. Day v. Rosenthal, 217 Cal. Rptr. 89, 102 (Ct. App. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048
(1986)(standards for attorney's ethical duties conclusively defined by Rules). In instances
where an attorney's performance is so obviously contrary to established standards, the court
concluded that expert testimony is not required to find negligence on the part of the attorney.
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ethical violations create a presumption that the malpractice standard
of care has been breached. 65 Some courts, on the other hand, argue
that ethical violations have no place whatsoever in malpractice actions.6 6 In the majority of cases, the standard of care allegedly
breached must be established with the use of an expert witness.67
IV.
A.

THE RULES AND MALPRACTICE: TEXAS

HistoricalRelationship

Texas courts have not agreed as to the exact role disciplinary rules
play in legal malpractice actions. In 1978, the Corpus Christi Court
of Appeals in Martin v. Trevino 68 ruled that a violation of a disciplinary rule did not, in itself, create a private cause of action for malpractice.6 9 While the Martin ruling has often been followed, it must
be noted the allegations in Martin were not made by a client, but
rather by a doctor against whom the attorney had filed a medical malpractice suit on behalf of a client.7 0
Other courts have been less decisive when faced with the question
of whether a violation of a disciplinary rule creates a private cause of
Id. The court ruled that an attorney's duty to a client was not limited to the skill required of
attorneys, but also included the obligation of protecting the client's best interest in all circumstances, including ethically. The requisite ethical duties are established in the Rules of Professional Conduct and such duties cannot be changed through the use of expert testimony. Id.
(emphasis in original).
65. See Sawabini v. Desenberg, 372 N.W.2d 559, 566 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985)(violation of
Code creates rebuttable presumption of actionable malpractice); Lipton v. Boesky, 313
N.W.2d 163, 167 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981)(rebuttable presumption of malpractice created when
Code violated). The Lipton court reasoned that because the Code defined the standard of
conduct expected of attorneys in relationships with their peers, the legal system, and the public
in general; it would be "patently unfair" to hold that an individual client could not rely on the
same standards in relationships with his/her own attorney. Lipton, 313 N.W.2d at 166-67.
66. See Helmbrecht v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 362 N.W.2d 118, 128 (Wis. 1985)(Code is helpful
in defining attorney's ethical conduct but defines neither the obligations owed to client nor the
standard of care for civil liability).
67. See Miami Int'l Realty Co. v. Paynter, 841 F.2d 348, 352-53 (10th Cir. 1988)(standard of care must be established by expert testimony, but expert may refer to Code as standard
which is followed by state's attorneys); Carlson v. Morton, 745 P.2d 1133, 1137-38 (Mont.
1987)(expert testimony required to establish standard of care). See generally R. MALLEN & J.
SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 15.7, at 881 (3d. ed. 1989)(use of ethical standards by expert
witness to determine standard of care). The authors point out, however, that the expert who
establishes the standard of care which has allegedly been breached often uses ethical standards
to form his/her opinion of the relevant standard. Id.
68. 578 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
69. Id. at 770.
70. Id. at 764.
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action. In Citizens State Bank of Dickinson v. Shapiro,7 the appellee
attorneys questioned the existence of a cause of action which was allegedly based upon violations of various disciplinary rules.7 2 The
court avoided answering the question by "assum[ing], without deciding, that the allegations of appellant's petition state a cause of action
for legal malpractice, whether it be stated in terms of intentional violations of disciplinary rules, negligence, or negligence per se."'73 A
similar result was reached in Avila v. Havana Painting Co., where
the court ruled that an alleged violation of a disciplinary rule actually
gave rise to a cause of action in tort." Use of the Code has not been
limited to malpractice actions. Courts have also referred to the Code
when determining whether multiple or subsequent representations
76
present a conflict of interest.
Perhaps the most common use of the Code in Texas, however, is by
experts testifying in malpractice cases. Mr. Thomas Watkins,77 who
testifies regularly as an expert in legal malpractice cases, has routinely
utilized the Code to establish the minimum standard of care for a
"reasonable prudent attorney." As with other experts, his opinion of
71. 575 S.W. 2d 375 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
72. Id. at 386.
73. Id. The court summarily concluded that the action was a tort action regardless of
what it was named, and therefore the action was barred by the applicable two-year statute of
limitations. The plaintiff in Citizens State Bank also alleged the defendant attorneys breached
an implied warranty to comply with the attorney-client contract; to provide services and information which would be knowledgeable, accurate and truly reflect the current state of the law;
and to honor and respect the obligations inherent in such a fiduciary relationship. Id. As with
the question concerning the Code violations, the court reasoned that although the allegations
were phrased in terms of a cause of action in contract, the plaintiff was basically alleging
tortious conduct (fraud, misrepresentation, negligence). The allegations were therefore barred
by the statute of limitations. Id. at 387.
74. 761 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
75. Id. at 400. The defendant attorney was charged with violating DR 9-102(B) which
requires an -attorney to promptly pay a client all securities, funds or other property to which
the client is entitled. Id.
76. See Petroleum Wholesale, Inc. v. Marshall, 751 S.W.2d 295, 301 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1988, no writ)(chinese wall insufficient when attorney in firm has actual knowledge of confidences in specific case). The firm was representing a client whose interests were in conflict
with a former client of the individual attorney, whom he had represented in the same case
while he was in private practice. Id.; see also Mallou v. Payne & Vendig, 750 S.W.2d 251, 258
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied)(disciplinary rules prohibit multiple representation if
independent professional judgment jeopardized as result).
77. Explanation of expert witness' use of the Code was provided by Mr. Thomas H. Watkins, with Hilgers & Watkins, in Austin, Texas. Mr. Watkins, who regularly testifies as an
expert in legal malpractice cases, is a member of the Professional Ethics Committee of the
State Bar and a former Chairman of the District 9 Grievance Committee.
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whether the attorney's conduct was negligent is then based upon
whether or not the conduct in question violated the Code's disciplinary rules.
B.

Predictionsfor the Future

What lies ahead? To date, only appellate courts have ruled on the
role the Code should play in legal malpractice actions. There is no
guarantee that the supreme court will follow the reasoning of lower
courts that a violation of the Rules is not actionable in and of itself.
Nor will the court necessarily find itself bound by the disclaimer in
the preamble to the Rules.
At a minimum, the Rules, like their predecessor the Code, will continue to be utilized by expert witnesses as a means of establishing the
standard of care in malpractice cases. Significantly, in Cosgrove v.
Grimes,7" the Texas Supreme Court recently clarified that the standard of care in legal malpractice cases is objective, not subjective:
there is no longer a good-faith exception to a malpractice claim." In
effect, therefore, an attorney could be found civilly liable for a violation of the Rules if the Rules are the basis used to establish the reasonable prudent attorney standard.
78. 774 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1989).
79. Id. at 664-65 (court clarified that standard is objective, not subjective). The attorney
in Grimes filed suit on behalf of a car accident victim. Unfortunately, suit was filed against the
passenger of the car instead of the driver, and the error was not discovered until after the
statute of limitations had run. Id. at 663. The attorney's proposed issues included the goodfaith defense that he'd relied on the information provided by the client. The court rejected the
defense, reasoning that to permit an attorney to assert a good-faith exception to the reasonable
prudent attorney standard once the attorney's action was found to be unreasonable under the
standard, would create a burden so great that it could never be overcome by clients who had
been wronged. Id. at 664-65; see also Bobbitt v. Weeks, 774 S.W.2d 638, 639 (Tex. 1989)(following Grimes rejection of good-faith defense in legal malpractice). Suit was filed in Weeks on
behalf of a child who was the sole survivor when an airplane crashed into his family's home.
Weeks recommended the settlement offer be accepted, which it was. Weeks then refused to file
a subsequent administrative claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act with the FAA and the
United States alleging negligence on the part of an air traffic controller, despite insistence from
his client that he do so. The statute of limitations expired, and the client brought this action,
alleging that Weeks had failed to adequately investigate the claim and had failed to file claims
against all responsible parties. The client also charged that a "reasonable prudent attorney"
would have negotiated a higher settlement and would have filed a claim under the Federal Tort
Claims Act. Id. at 638. Citing Grimes, the court remanded the case, ruling that the trial court
had committed error by submitting a jury issue which included a definition of negligence allowing that an attorney did not act negligently if "he acted in good faith and in an honest belief
that his acts were in the best interests of his clients." Id. at 639.
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What are the chances of an eventual supreme court ruling that the
Rules establish the minimum standard of care in malpractice actions?
Pretty good, according to Mr. Steve Peterson, former General Counsel for the State Bar.8 ° Peterson notes that the trend of the supreme
court over the past few years has been to create a "right" when necessary to correct a "wrong." The grievance procedure provides no remedy for persons "wronged" by conduct sufficient to warrant
disbarring or disciplining an attorney. Peterson points out that the
typical grievance involves the attorney-client relationship. He finds it
distressing to see the anomaly created when the legal profession holds
itself to a minimum standard of care in its relationship with other
attorneys and the judicial system in general, yet it resists holding itself
to that same minimum standard in its relationships with clients.
What about the disclaimer? Peterson sees it as being nothing more
than a self-serving statement written by lawyers, reviewed by lawyers,
and approved by lawyers. He doubts the supreme court will find the
disclaimer to be a significant barrier should they choose to rule that a
violation of the Rules is an independent basis for civil liability
(although he notes that judges are also lawyers).
A determination that a violation of the Rules forms the basis of
civil liability in and of itself could lead to a change in the grievance
procedure as well. Because of the lack of due process in the initial
stages of the grievance procedure, a committee may be less anxious to
process a complaint filed against an attorney knowing that a Rule
violation could be the basis for civil liability. As a result, the courts
could replace the grievance process as the primary means of challenging questionable attorney behavior.
An equally far-reaching question is whether the supreme court will
eventually find that implied warranties apply to services such as legal
services, where the transaction is based upon the professional judgment of the service provider. Considering its attempt to make just
such a ruling in the first opinion of Melody Home and subsequent
references in later cases that the determination of whether such a warranty exists is still undetermined,8" the question is certainly not moot.
80. Mr. Steve Peterson served as General Counsel for the State Bar from September, 1985
through November, 1989; and as 1st Assistant and Chief of Litigation from July, 1979 through
September, 1985. He is currently in private practice at 114 West 7th Street, Austin, Texas,
practicing General Civil Litigation with special emphasis on Professional Responsibility, Professional Ethics and Professional Liability (no board certification implied).

81. See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
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The Rules would be the most logical place for the supreme court to
"find" such a warranty, should it rule that a warranty exists.
V.

CONCLUSION

At a minimum, the Rules will play a role comparable to the Code;
that of establishing the reasonable prudent attorney standard in malpractice actions by way of expert witness testimony. Whether they
are formally ruled to be the standard of care in and of themselves is
irrelevant; the effect is the same, according to Peterson.82
It is less certain whether an implied warranty actionable under the
DTPA will be found to apply to legal services. The Texas Supreme
Court has clearly not closed the door on such a possibility, however.
Perhaps the more difficult question to answer is "Why shouldn't the
Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct establish the standard of care for civil liability?" The Rules establish the minimum
standard lawyers must meet in relationships with each other, the legal
system, and the public as a whole. Shouldn't the same minimum standard be applicable to the attorney-client relationship? Because it is
subject to the Sunset Act, the State Bar will be abolished on September 1, 1991 unless its existence is continued pursuant to the Act. It
may be difficult to convince the public that the legal profession should
continue to be a self-governing entity and at the same time justify the
double standard of care.
The Rules became effective January 1, 1990. The best and safest
approach is for all Texas attorneys to simply read the rules and to
assume that a violation will result in liability to a client as well as to
the Bar.

82. See supra note 80. In Peterson's words, "[if] it looks like a duck, walks like a duck,
and sounds like a duck, it IS a duck, even if everyone calls it a dog."
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